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Abstract
We examine the trajectories of the real unit labour costs (RULCs) in a selection of
Eurozone economies. Strong asymmetries in the convergence process of the RULCs
and its components—real wages, capital intensity, and technology—are uncovered
through decomposition and cluster analyses. In the last three decades, the PIIGS
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) succeeded in reducing their RULCs by more
than their northern partners. With the exception of Ireland, however, technological
progress was weak; it was through capital intensification that periphery economies
gained efficiency and competitiveness. Cluster heterogeneity, and lack of robustness in
cluster composition, is a reflection of the difficulties in achieving real convergence and,
by extension, nominal convergence. We conclude by outlining technology as the key
convergence factor, and call for a wider strategy in labour market policies, which
should be more oriented to promote the sources of productivity growth.
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1 Introduction
Nominal convergence versus real convergence. Can the former last in the absence of the
latter? Even if the Great Recession provides a negative answer, any state in the European
Union (EU) desiring to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is still subject to
meet the Maastricht criteria. These criteria, which were designed to ensure nominal con-
vergence,1 entailed the implicit assumption that real convergence would naturally follow.
This presumption has miserably failed. Not only have these countries lacked real conver-
gence (in per capita GDP or unemployment rates), but “the strengthened financial and
real connections across the EMU countries, instead of facilitating convergence (. . .) have
magnified and mutually reinforced imbalances” (Croci and Farina 2012, p. 647).
Although it has become standard to refer to this slump as a ‘sovereign-debt crisis’, our
view is that the rise in public deficits and debts, more than a governments’ fail in the man-
agement of national fiscal policies, is the consequence of differences in competitiveness
that generate real divergence and, therefore, growing account imbalances2. Our claim is
that these imbalances, which were exacerbated with the EMU, were already present in
latent form. This is contrary to Sinn’s claim that “the lack of competitiveness was brought
about by the euro itself” (Sinn 2014, p. 1). They reflected, indeed, a structural situa-
tion to which we implicitly refer when we divide the Eurozone into Core and Periphery
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economies, acknowledging that the first group is far more competitive than the second
one.3 Ultimately, this is what explains the real divergence we have witnessed since the
inception of the euro, and it is also at the root of the differential intensity of the Great
Recession in the Eurozone, once the sovereign-debt problem joined in in 2010.
In this paper we take the real unit labour cost (RULC) as a relevant indicator of com-
petitiveness and, as such, as a driver of real convergence. We examine to what extent
our hypothesis of latent divergence forces holds by clustering the RULC according to its
performance in a selection of 11 Eurozone economies. This variable is defined as
RULC = Real compensation per employeeReal labour productivity , (1)
which allows our analysis to be performed on the RULC as a whole, but also on its two
main components4.
In this way, our paper takes a step forward with respect to Monfort et al. (2013), who
conduct a similar analysis, but based on labour productivity. Not only do we identify the
existence of clusters, but we also ascribe the identified convergence clubs to specific com-
ponents of the RULCs, with labour productivity decomposed into capital intensity and
technological components. This allows us to enrich the analysis on the sources of the lack
of full convergence in Europe, in spite of decades of growing economic integration.
To take a first glance at the evolution in RULCs, Table 1 shows their cumulated evo-
lution between 1979 and 2012. The first noticeable feature is the fall in all economies,
which ranges from 5% to 25%. This is a reflection of the systematic effort undertaken by
these economies to become more competitive in a context of growing market pressures
(acceleration in the globalisation process and deeper European integration).
It is also interesting to observe that the most intensive reductions have taken place in
the Eurozone periphery. Ireland takes the lead, with a fall of 25 percentage points (pp)
that is followed by some Club-Med countries—Greece, Portugal and Spain—with a fall
around 20 pp. Then we find Italy (-15 pp.), which comes after Sweden.5 Thus, maybe
surprisingly, the sometimes called PIIG economies, appear as those that have undergone
the most intensive effort in controlling their RULCs. At the other extreme we observe
continental European economies such as Finland and Belgium, with falls below 10 pp6.
Given these differences, dating back to the 1980s, we do not support the idea that the
inception of the Euro brought, inherently to the new monetary union, the development
of unprecedented external imbalances. We rather see these imbalances as a reflection of
a latent structural problem that was exacerbated in the context of a single currency and
the impossibility of securing competitive gains through the prevailing, and convenient,
management of the exchange rate.
Table 1 RULC in selected Eurozone economies
1979 2012 ∇ 1979 2012 ∇
Ireland 100.0 74.7 -25.3 Austria 100.0 87.1 -12.9
Spain 100.0 78.8 -21.2 Netherlands 100.0 87.7 -12.3
Portugal 100.0 80.0 -20.0 France 100.0 89.0 -11.0
Greece 100.0 81.8 -18.2 Finland 100.0 92.1 -7.9
Sweden 100.0 83.0 -17.0 Belgium 100.0 95.2 -4.8
Italy 100.0 85.1 -14.9
Source: Ameco Database.
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Our hypothesis is that the root of these imbalances is related to the specificities of the
growth model in the periphery and core European countries. This hypothesis gets some
initial support from a descriptive analysis showing that the periphery economies have
mainly relied on capital intensification to counterbalance their otherwise smaller increase
in wages. Increases in capital intensity are recognised to boost efficiency, but we argue
that this is an inferior strategy than the one followed by the core economies, much more
based on technological progress.
To check the validity of our hypothesis, our first target is to evaluate the existence
of clusters in the RULCs of some Eurozone economies. The second target is to assess
whether these clusters are driven by some of the components in which the RULCs can be
decomposed. These are real wages, capital intensity, and technology, the latter two being
the drivers of labour productivity and economic growth.
For the clusters to be examined, we first decompose the RULCs into these three compo-
nents and compute their simulated trajectories when either one or two of the components
take their actual values. This provides a first picture of the evolution of the Eurozone
economies, in terms of the path followed by their RULCs. Three groups emerge. One
with the Club-Med countries, which we classify as capital-intensity driven economies;
another one with technology-driven economies such as Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and Sweden; and a third onewith balanced-growth driven economies, where
capital intensity and technology have similar explanatory weights. Here we find Austria
and France.
To evaluate the existence of clusters, we follow the methodology proposed by Phillips
and Sul (2007, 2009) in which different convergence paths can be distinguished among
heterogenous economies involved in a convergence process. As explained in Section 4,
this heterogeneity is modelled through a nonlinear time varying factor model, which
provides flexibility in idiosyncratic behaviour over time—convergence is a dynamic
process—and across section—since we examine a group of 11 economies.
We find these features particularly appealing to examine the convergence process of
the RULCs in the Eurozone. The main reason is that, although economies with different
economic size and structure may appear to follow a similar development path, they may
converge at different speeds and, therefore, may actually be at different stages of that same
path. Moreover, although Phillips and Sul’s (2007, 2009) modelling allows for idiosyn-
cratic behaviour, it also retains some commonality across the panel. In particular, it allows
to check the convergence to a constant of the heterogeneous time varying idiosyncratic
components, in which case panel convergence holds.
The cluster analysis involves the actual series of the RULCs and all the simulated sce-
narios in which these costs are decomposed, each of them accounting for the influence
of one, two or three of the RULCs components. We find a wide heterogeneity of clusters
both in number—different scenarios deliver a different number of clusters—and composi-
tion—the composition of the clusters is not robust across simulations.
Given these results—the expected outcome after years of economic integration was,
ex-ante, convergence to a single cluster in all major macroeconomic dimensions—we
question the strategy, originally endorsed by the Maastricht Treaty, of securing nomi-
nal convergence without considering real convergence indicators. Rather, we suggest to
consider both nominal and real convergence simultaneously in order to safeguard, or at
least strengthen, today’s hurt process of European integration. In this context, taking into
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account that it is the dispersion of total factor productivity, and not that of wage compen-
sation, what has driven the lack of convergence in RULCs, labour market policies should
be designed and coordinated to promote convergence in total productivity growth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a decomposition
of the RULCs, which is applied to a broad selection of Eurozone economies in Section 3. In
Section 4, we explain the methodology we use for the cluster analysis. Section 5 presents
our findings before discussing their major implications in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical decomposition
To study its evolution over time, the real unit labour costs (RULC) can be decomposed in
its relevant constituents.
We start by re-writing Equation (1) as
RULCt = Total real employment compensationReal output or
wt
yt
, (2)
where wt denotes real wages or, in other words, the nominal wages deflated by prices
(Wt/Pt). In turn, yt is real output or the nominal output also deflected by prices (Yt/Pt).
Under the assumption of a production function with capital Kt , labour Lt , and technology
At as production factors, (nominal) output per employee Yt/Lt can be expressed as:
(Yt/Lt) = Pt ∗ K (1−αt)t ∗ At , (3)
where αt is the time-varying labour income share.
Inserting (3) in (2) and differentiating, the growth rate of real unit labour costs (RULCt)RULCt−1
can be decomposed as a function of the trajectories of real wages, capital intensity, and
technological progress.
(RULCt)
RULCt−1
≈
(
(Wt)
Wt−1
− (Pt)Pt−1
)
− (1 − αt) ∗ (Kt)Kt−1 −
(At)
At−1
. (4)
The first term in Equation (4) accounts for the rise in the RULCs arising from increases
in real compensation per employee. The second and third terms account, respectively, for
the fall in the RULCt resulting from growing capital intensity and quicker technological
progress. It is important to note that these two terms – (1 − αt)∗ (Kt)Kt−1 and (At)At−1 – are the
driving forces of labour productivity, as written in Equation (1), and, hence, of economic
growth.
Following this decomposition, Table 2 shows the three simulated scenarios that can be
computed (we call them Simulations 1, 4 and 7 because new scenarios in between are
added below, in Table 7). In Simulation 1, the RULCs only respond to changes in real
wages (there is no progress in either capital deepening nor in technological change). In
Simulation 4, they respond to real wages and capital intensity (and there is no techno-
logical progress). In Simulation 7, the three components are taken into account, and the
resulting simulation can be interpretted as the overall fit of our decomposition to the
actual data.
3 Empirical decomposition
3.1 Data
We use annual data obtained from the macro-economic database of the European
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). Our
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Table 2 Simulated RULCs
wt
wt−1 (1 − αt)
Kt
Kt−1
At
At−1 Outcome
Simulation 1  − − RULC1t in the absence of capital
intensity and TFP.
Simulation 4   − RULC4t in the absence of
TFP.
Simulation 7    RULC7t accounted for by the
three components (overall fit).
Note: See Table 7, where more scenarios are defined.
sample period runs from 1980 to 2012. Table 3 presents the variables used, together with
the corresponding codes in the Ameco Database.
Figure A1 in the Additional file 1: Appendix 1. compares the actual growth rates of the
RULCs with those obtained from the decomposition proposed in Equation (4). One rele-
vant feature of this decomposition is the existence of non-negligible differences between
the actual and the simulated trajectories of the RULCs in the 1960s and the 1970s. In
levels, these differences end up producing significant discrepancies which would blur
the picture obtained with the decomposition analysis. This is the reason why we have
excluded these two decades and decided to depart in 1979 and focus on the changes
occurred in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. On one side, this still give us enough degrees of
freedom to safely conduct the cluster exercise. On the other side, this restricts the anal-
ysis to the aftermath of the oil price shocks and excludes noise from the structural break
that these shocks caused on all advanced economies.
3.2 Evolution by components
Table 4 shows the evolution of the RULCs (as in Table 1) and each of its components
up to 2012 departing from an index value 100 corresponding to 1979. As we know from
Table 1, the RULCs have fallen relatively more in the periphery economies than in the
non-periphery ones. They have fallen by 19.9 per cent, on average, in Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which is almost twofold the 10.6 per cent fall achieved, on
average, by the others.
The larger reduction in the overall RULC index in the periphery coincides with a smaller
increase in wages (44.5% vs. 51.7%, respectively, each of the two areas) and a substantial
larger increase in the capital intensity component (37.7 vs. 20.8 per cent). In contrast, the
evolution of the TFP component in the Core economies has been much more dynamic,
showing an average increase of 38.9 per cent, in clear contrast with the 17.8 per cent rise
observed in the Mediterranean ones. Ireland is excluded from this last calculation, as it
Table 3 Definitions and codes
Variable Notation Code
Real unit labour cost RULC QLCD
Nominal compensation per employee W HWCDW
Labour income share α ALCD
Net capital stock at constant prices per person employed K RKNDE
Total Factor Productivity A ZVGDF
Price deflator for Gross Domestic Product at market prices P PVGD
Note: the Codes correspond to Ameco Database variables.
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Table 4 RULCs and components: index 100= 1979 and values in 2012
1979 Values in 2012
RULCt
RULCt−1
wt
wt−1 (1 − αt)
Kt
Kt−1
At
At−1
(I) (II) (III) (I)
(III)
(II)
(III)
Periphery
Greece 100.0 81.8 104.7 129.5 100.2 104% 129%
Ireland 100.0 74.7 197.2 138.6 189.6 104% 73%
Italy 100.0 85.1 122.7 125.5 116.5 105% 108%
Portugal 100.0 80.0 169.5 154.9 137.6 123% 113%
Spain 100.0 78.8 128.3 139.8 116.9 110% 120%
Average 100.0 80.1 144.5 137.7 132.2 109% 109%
Non-periphery
Austria 100.0 87.1 152.4 129.7 133.9 114% 97%
Belgium 100.0 95.2 148.3 118.0 129.4 115% 91%
Finland 100.0 92.1 182.3 120.4 159.8 114% 75%
France 100.0 89.0 137.9 126.7 122.9 112% 103%
Netherlands 100.0 87.7 136.3 115.6 132.8 103% 87%
Sweden 100.0 83.0 153.9 123.5 149.4 103% 83%
Average 100.0 89.4 151.7 120.8 138.9 109% 88%
Source: Own decomposition based on official European Commission data (Ameco Database).
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has been a clear exception with an important cumulative growth both in capital intensity
and, especially, in TFP, with a 89.6 per cent increase.
Beyond the identification of these two groups, a further crucial result is that in none
of these economies have wage progressed much beyond their sustainable growth. By
sustainable growth we mean one that is consistent with the progress of technology.
Indeed, following any standard growth model, the reference wage growth would be
set according to technological change so as to ensure a long-run balanced growth path.
Denoting γa as the growth rate of technology, γk as the growth rate of capital accumu-
lation (per employee), and γw the growth rate of wages, a balanced growth path would
satisfy:
γw = γk = γa. (5)
On this account it is worthwhile noting that the evolution of the periphery economies
since the end of the 1970s is, in general, closer to the above standard theoretical rule.
With the exception of Portugal, wages in these countries have evolved closer to the levels
granted by technological progress than in most non-periphery countries. But this is not
the only significant trait. It can also be observed that capital intensity has also progressed
more, relative to technology, in the periphery (with the exception of Ireland) than in the
non-periphery economies.
From these results, we draw the following preliminary conclusions. First, the relative
trajectories of wages and capital intensity uncover the two channels by which the periph-
ery countries have succeeded in reducing the RULCs by far more than the non-periphery
ones. Second, we hypothesise that the problem underlying the lack of real convergence
is not originated in the labour market but, rather, in the different speed of technologi-
cal progress, which is what effectively leads wage setting and the capital accumulation
process.
In addition, because the evaluation of these ratios is silent on the relative magnitude of
each component’s influence on the RULCs, we next look at the detailed contribution of
each of these components to the evolution of the RULCs.
3.3 Scenarios
Figures 1, 2 and 3 group the 11 Eurozone economies considered according to the inten-
sity at which the growth drivers—capital intensity and technological progress—have
counterbalanced the rise in the RULCs stemming from real wage growth.
The black line depicts the actual trajectory, which is closely tracked by the line in green
resulting from Simulation 7 in Table 2 (i.e., the one with the three components providing
the overall fit of the decomposition). This is an indication that the decomposition analysis
provides a faithful account of the incidence of each component in the aggregate evolution
of the RULCs.
The blue line accounts for the upward effect that the growth in real wages exert, while
the red line incorporates (on top of the effect of the growth in real wages) the downward
influence of capital intensity. In this way, the distance in 2012 between the blue and the
red lines is an indication of the cumulated counterbalancing effect of capital intensity on
the RULCs since 1979, while the distance between the red and green lines is an indication
of the incidence of technological progress.
Ordóñez et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:15 Page 8 of 19
70
80
90
100
110
120
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
S1 = Simulation with no capital deepening & no technical chage
S2 = S1 + Capital deepening
S3 = S2 + Technical change (Ov erall f it)
Actual trajectory
a   Greece 
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Simulation 1
Simulation 2
Simulation 3
Actual
b  Italy
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Simulated 1
Simulated 2
Simulated 2
Actual
c  Portugal
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Simulated 1
Simulated 2
Simulated 3
Actual
d  Spain
Figure 1 Capital-intensity driven economies. Source: Own decomposition based on official European
Commission data (Ameco Database).
As it is the case for the countries plotted in Figure 1, proximity of the red and green
lines is an indication that technological progress has been weak in last decades. This is
the reason why these economies are grouped under the label of capital intensity driven
economies.
In turn, in the economies plotted in Figure 2, the cumulative impact of technological
progress is much wider and explains a much larger proportion than capital intensity of
the shift from the RULCs when real wages are the only driving force to the actual lower
value they take in 2012. These are, therefore, the group of technology driven economies
with regard to the path followed by their RULCs.
Then in Figure 3 we have the two balanced driven economies in the sense that nei-
ther capital intensity nor technological progress dominate in explaining the downward
trajectory of the RULCs, once accounting for the rise in real wages.
Table 5 provides more detailed information on the precise values of the RULCs under
the scenarios considered. The first block of columns provides the final values taken by the
RULCs under the different scenarios considered in Table 2 and plotted in Figures 1, 2, 3
(we call them A, B, and C). Note that the value in C, resulting from simulation 7, is very
close to the actual values of the RULCs in 2012 (in first column of Table 4).
The second block exploits this information to obtain the change in the RULCs due to
the evolution of real wages (=A−100, where 100 is the departing index value), of capital
intensity (=B−A), and technological progress (=C−B). It can be observed that, with the
exception of Portugal, the Club-Med economies experienced relatively mild increases in
the RULCs in response to real wages—below 30 percentage points. On the contrary, in
the rest of economies this value was above 30 percentage points. This contrasted patterns
is a reflection of differences in the progress of labour productivity.
The sources of these differences can be assessed by looking at the contributions of the
two growth drivers, capital intensity and technological change7. On this account, no clear
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Figure 2 Technology driven economies. Source: Own decomposition based on official European
Commission data (Ameco Database).
pattern can be perceived when looking at the role played by capital intensity in percentage
point changes. In particular, with the exception of Portugal, the rest of the Club-Med
countries have values between -24 and -37 pp, whereas (with the exception of Ireland),
the rest of economies have values between -18 and -35. There is, therefore, a relatively
homogeneous impact of the progress in capital accumulation on the reduction of the
RULCs in the late decades across Eurozone countries.
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Figure 3 Balanced driven economies. Source: Own decomposition based on official European Commission
data (Ameco Database).
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Table 5 RULCs and components
Simulations Changes explained by: % Growth drivers*
S1 S4 S7 wt (1 − αt)Kt At
(A) (B) (C) (A-100) (B-A) (C-B) (B-A)(A-C)
(C-B)
(A-C)
Capital-intensity driven gains in RULCs
Greece 104.7 80.3 79.7 4.7 -24.4 -0.7 97.4 2.6
Italy 122.7 97.8 83.5 22.7 -25.0 -14.3 63.6 36.4
Portugal 169.5 109.4 79.3 69.5 -60.1 -30.1 66.7 33.3
Spain 128.3 91.7 78.1 28.3 -36.6 -13.6 73.0 27.0
Technology driven gains in RULCs
Belgium 148.3 125.8 96.9 48.3 -22.4 -28.9 43.7 56.3
Finland 182.3 151.6 93.2 82.3 -30.7 -58.3 34.5 65.5
Ireland 197.2 142.5 73.6 97.2 -54.7 -68.9 44.3 55.7
Netherlands 136.3 118.0 88.3 36.3 -18.3 -29.7 38.2 61.8
Sweden 153.9 124.6 82.8 53.9 -29.3 -41.7 41.2 58.8
Balanced driven gains in RULCs
Austria 152.4 117.6 87.4 52.4 -34.8 -30.2 53.5 46.5
France 137.9 109.0 88.3 37.9 -29.0 -20.6 58.4 41.6
Notes: S1, S4 and S7 correspond to Simulations 1, 4, and 7, as defined in Table 2; *:indicates the relative share of capital intensity and technological progress on the overall downward impact of these growth drivers on RULCs.
Source: Own decomposition based on official European Commission data (Ameco Database).
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The main difference, in this context, can be found in the contribution of technological
progress to the fall of these costs, which has been very poor in the Club-Med economies
(bar Portugal), but large in the other ones (bar France, which is in between the two
groups and, on this respect, resembles its Mediterranean neighbours). This can be eas-
ily seen through the third block of columns in Table 5, where information is provided on
the relative share of capital intensity and technological progress in explaining the overall
downward contribution of these growth drivers to the fall of the RULCs.
In the Club-Med economies, the fall in RULCs have been mainly driven by progress
in capital intensity which accounts, at least, for 66.3% of the fall as in Italy. This leaves
technological progress to account, on average, in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, for a third of
the fall in the RULCs. Greece is an extreme case where the contribution of TFP has been
almost non-existent.
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden have in common a contribution
of TFP which is explains at least 55% of the fall, and reaches two thirds in Ireland. This is
the group of economies with technology driven gains in RULCs.
Finally, Austria and France take an intermediate position with a balanced contribution
of the growth drivers to the fall in RULCs. The capital intensity share is around 55%, and
thus significantly lower than in the Club-Med economies, while the share of technological
progress is around 45%, and thus significantly lower than in the Nordic and Continental
European countries.
From this analysis, we conclude that differences in the speed of technological progress
is a major determinant of the unlikely evolution of the RULCs in the Eurozone countries.
Note that this conclusion is endorsed by the prediction, from any standard neoclassical
growth model, that technology is the key growth driver and, hence, the critical factor
allowing for capital accumulation and wage growth in the long-run. To confirm this
finding, we now turn to a cluster analysis seeking to classify these economies into signifi-
cantly homogeneous groups according to the individual and joint influence of the RULCs
components.
4 Cluster analysis
The panel data model by Phillips and Sul (2007) has been proposed to represent the
behaviour of economies in transition allowing for different convergence paths with het-
erogeneous individuals. Heterogeneity is formulated as a nonlinear time varying factor
model which provides flexibility in idiosyncratic behaviour over time and across section.
These features of the model are very appealing in the case of convergence in the euro
Eurozone. Countries with different economic sizes and structures may appear to fol-
low a similar development path but at different speeds so that they are currently at
different stages on that path. The effect on technological and capital accumulation
caused by the different economic policies in different countries may also be important
to explain different speeds of convergence. The model allows for idiosyncratic behaviour
and also retains some commonality across the panel, meaning that when the heteroge-
neous time varying idiosyncratic components converge over time to a constant, panel
convergence holds.
Phillips and Sul (2007) decompose the variable of interest in two components, one com-
mon, μt , and one idiosyncratic, δit , both of which are time-varying. This formulation
incorporates the possibility of transitional heterogeneity or even transitional divergence
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and enables testing for convergence by testing whether the factor loadings δit converge
(see Additional file 2: Appendix for details).
The convergence approach by Phillips and Sul (2007) presents clear advantages. First,
it is a test for relative convergence as it measures convergence to some cross-sectional
average in contrast to the concept of level convergence analysed by Bernard and Durlauf
(1995). Second, this approach outperforms the standard panel unit root tests since in the
latter case Xit − Xjt may retain nonstationary characteristics even though the conver-
gence condition holds. In other words, a panel unit root test may classify the difference
between gradually converging series as non-stationary. As a further problem, a mixture of
stationary and non-stationary series in the panel may bias results. Moreover, test results
are sometimes not particularly robust. In contrast, the Phillips and Sul (2007) test does
not depend on any particular assumption concerning trend stationarity or stochastic
nonstationarity of the variables to be tested.
5 Clusters in the RULCs and its components
Our cluster analysis involves the evaluation of several scenarios. The first one is the anal-
ysis on the actual trajectory of the RULCs, which is followed by the analysis on the seven
simulated trajectories of the RULCs presented in Table 6. In Simulations 1, 2 and 3, the
RULCs only respond to changes in one of the components. These are, respectively, real
wages (there is no progress in either capital deepening nor in technical change), capital
intensity (there is no growth in real wages nor in TFP), and technological change (real
wages and capital intensity do not change). In Simulations 4, 5 and 6, RULCs respond to
two out of the three components. As noted before, in the first of these, real wages and
capital intensity (but not technological progress) are taken into account; in the second
one (Simulation 5) real wages and TFP (but not capital intensity) are considered, whereas
Simulation 6 assumes no growth in real wages. Simulation 7 takes into account the
influence of the three components and accounts for the overall fit of the decomposition.
Table 6 RULCs: actual and simulated
RULC
RULCt−1
wt
wt−1 (1 − αt)
Kt
Kt−1
At
At−1 Outcome
Actual  − − − Clusters on actual aggregate data.
Simulation 1 −  − − RULC1t in the absence of capital
intensity and TFP.
Simulation 2 − −  − RULC2t in the absence of real
wages and TFP.
Simulation 3 − − −  RULC3t in the absence of real
wages and capital intensity.
Simulation 4 −   − RULC4t in the absence of TFP.
Simulation 5 −  −  RULC5t in the absence of
capital intensity.
Simulation 6 − −   RULC6t in the absence of real
real wages.
Simulation 7 −    RULC7t accounted for by the
three components (overall fit).
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Detailed information on the results of the cluster analysis for each of these scenarios
is presented in Additional file 2: Appendix 2. Table 7 summarises the outcome of this
analysis when applied to the scenarios described in Table 6. Regarding the actual values
of the RULCs, our results uncover the existence of two groups, one comprising Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands belonging to the continental Europe,
and another one comprising the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and
Spain) plus Sweden. The PIIGS group is characterised by structural difficulties to compete
internationally, and a regular use of the exchange rate—in the pre-EMU era—to com-
pensate for their positive inflation differentials with respect to their main trade partners.
Interesting enough, this was also the case of Sweden up to 1990 (see Freeman et al. 2010).
Note that these results are consistent with our decomposition analysis. The first cluster
includes three economies with technology-driven gains in the RULCs, plus the group with
balanced driven gains, while the second cluster incorporates the four countries charac-
terised by capital-intensity driven gains. This second cluster includes, in addition, Ireland
and Sweden.
Regarding Simulation 1, the first group identified in the cluster analysis puts together
Finland, Ireland, and Portugal. This should come as no surprise since these are the
economies that during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s have experienced, by far as shown in
Table 2, the largest growth in real wages. The second and third groups comprise, respec-
tively, Austria, Belgium and Sweden and, then, France and the Netherlands, while the last
one gathers Greece, Italy and Spain together.
Table 7 Clusters
Actual Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 6 Sim 7
Group 1
AU
BE
AU FR FR AU
BE FI BE GR FI BE GR BE
FI IR FI IT IR PO IT FI
FR PO NT SP NT FR
NT PO NT
SP
Group 2
AU
GR FR GR
IR AU AU FI IR
IT AU GR BE BE GR FI IT
PO BE IT NT NT IR IR PO
SP SW SW PO PO IT SW SP
SW SW NT SW
SP
SW
Group 3
FR
FR AU FI GR
NT FR IR IT
SW SP
Group 4
GR IR FR
IT PO
SP SP
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The classification in terms of capital intensity (Simulation 2) delivers groups that are
not as different from one another than those obtained from Simulations 1 and 3. The rea-
son is that, for real wages and TFP, there is much more dispersion in the evolution of the
countries, than for capital intensity (see Table 2)8. In any case, themost remarkable feature
regarding capital intensity is that group 3 clearly identifies Austria and France as com-
prising a group themselves, while group 1 comprises only technology-driven economies
(Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands).
The cluster analysis performed when TFP is the only variable allowed to affect the evo-
lution of the RULCs (Simulation 3) provides useful complementary information which
exploits wider differentials in the performance of the economies. Looking at the clus-
ters, it is worthwhile pointing out that the first group does fully coincide with one of the
clusters obtained from Simulation 4. The second and third ones, in turn, provide a very
close match. The only difference is that Sweden moves from the second group (when
both capital intensity and TFP are allowed to vary) to the third one (when only TFP
changes).
We interpret this close match as evidence that TFP is the strongest driver of labour
productivity, and, as such, growth policies deserve great attention from policy makers.
This idea is consistent with the recent finding by Wierts et al. (2014) that the effect of the
real exchange rate on exports in the Eurozone becomes smaller the higher the share of
high technology exports in total exports. Following this, specialisation in high tech sec-
tors pushes productivity and makes these economies less dependant of the real effective
exchange rate, which, in the absence of national currencies, is the relevant variable to
assess price competitiveness.
The contrast between the results under Simulations 1 and 3 virtually vanish in Simula-
tion 5, in which the RULCs are evaluated considering changes in wages (like in Simulation
1) and TFP (as in Simulation 3). The first club joins Belgium and Portugal, while a second
one contains the rest of the economies, although, in any case, we must state that the dif-
ferences between the two clubs are of minor order (recall that Belgium and Portugal are
the two countries where the ratio between wages and technology growth has been the lar-
gest—even though very close to the next economies in this ranking in the Belgian case).
Simulation 6 examines the clusters when both capital intensity and technology, but not
wages, drive the evolution of the RULCs. This implies that the two sources of labour
productivity are considered together. Since wages are fixed as a function of productivity,
the less clubs we find, the more homogeneous will be wage growth in the Eurozone.
This sixth scenario is the only one in which we find two clear clusters. On top of
this being the number of clusters obtained for the actual evolution of the RULCs, these
clubs have a salient feature. The first one contains the members of cluster 1 and 2 under
Simulation 3 (when technology was absent), while the second one exactly matches club 3
in Simulation 3. In other words, as opposed to capital intensity, technology seems to be
the fundamental driving force in the clustering of the countries and, therefore, in the real
convergence process.
To summarise, the actual path of the RULCs delivers two clusters which, in broad-brush
terms coincide with the periphery and non-periphery Eurozone groups that have charac-
terised the Sovereign-Debt crisis in 2010-2013. However, a wide variety of clusters emerge
when these economies are examined according to the incidence of wages, capital inten-
sity and technology on the RULCs. Four clusters exist in the first two simulations in which
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only wages or capital intensity affect the RULCs (with a different country-composition
of these four clusters), but three when only technology is allowed to change. Three exist
in the absence only of TFP changes, but two in the absence of capital intensity and real
wages influences (although these two are different among them, and also relative to the
two clubs resulting from the aggregate analysis).
6 The intertwinement of labour andmacroeconomic policy outcomes
Our analysis has taken into account more than three decades of the recent economic
history. The different countries studied include those in which the European integra-
tion process consolidated along the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) set up in
1960—with Austria, Portugal, and Sweden, and also Finland since 1961, among other
countries—and the European Economic Community (EEC)—with Belgium, France, Italy
and the Netherlands since the 1950s, and also Ireland (since 1973), Greece (1981), and
Spain (1986)—to which the EFTA economies joined subsequently.
In a globalised world with deep economic integration, one could have expected a strong
enough process of economic convergence so as to deliver a unique cluster. Beyond that,
one could even envisage a situation in which this club would be the same for all the sce-
narios considered, with technology leading the convergence in all major macro variables.
It is clear, however, that the Eurozone economies are actually far from such theoreti-
cal prediction. Although we have verified that wages have grown in a sustainable manner
all around following technological progress, their evolution is very heterogeneous as a
reflection of the variety of technological experiences. This is what we observe when clus-
tering systematically the RULCs so as to account for the incidence of one or two of the
components that determine their trajectory.
Already in the aftermath of the Great Recession, analysts and policy makers enquire on
the best policies to solve labour market problems such as long-run and youth unemploy-
ment, which affect the European economies asymmetrically. According to Krause et al.
(2014), experts think that the effects of the Great Recession is a long-lasting phenomenon.
Although our policy recommendations arise from the long-run perspective undertaken
in the analysis (going, as such, beyond a conjunctural appraisal), it fully coincides with the
diagnosis that current labour market problems are here to stay.
What is then the best policy response to deal with these long-lasting problems?
Within the Eurozone, the impossibility to embark into competitive devaluations has
rendered the leadership to internal devaluations. In this way, labour market reforms
enforcing wage moderation have been one of the pillars of the policy response. On one
side, these reforms are expected to allow employment to recover, while, on the other one,
they should also help economic growth by boosting net foreign demand. Accordingly,
wage moderation is seen as a very tempting response to the crisis, both at the labour mar-
ket and at macroeconomic levels (even more so in a context of austerity and ineffective
standard monetary policy).
In contrast to this common view, recent evidence outlines the difficulties of succeed-
ing in these policies in the Eurozone. Galí and Monacelli (2014), for example, show that
the relationship between wage flexibility and employment stability is connected to the
policy management of the exchange rate. This allows them to show that wage adjust-
ments are much more ineffective in a currency union such as the EMU (where most trade
occurs between economies with a fixed exchange rate) than in countries with a floating
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exchange rate and full control of their policies. Wage flexibility is not, therefore, such a
promising tool.
Our results point in another direction and align with those of Pancotto and Pericoli
(2014), who show that the introduction of the Euro has increased divergence in unit
labour costs. Not only this, but; when looking at the sources of this growing diver-
gence, it is the dispersion of productivity and not wage compensation that drives the
process. This suggests that “persisting idiosyncratic dynamics are driven by real factors,
i.e. diverging technological patterns, rather than by monetary factors, expressed by wage
compensation” [Pancotto and Pericoli, 2014, p. 371].
This assessment is fully consistent with our results and lead us to claim that, together
with conventional labour policies (in particular, the standard well known active labour
market policies, ALMPs), complementary policy measures should support total factor
productivity growth. By this, we are not only signalling standard measures such as R&D
expenditures and explicit support to innovation and patent applications. We also refer
to other qualitative factors intimately related to the labour market, such as on-the-job
training, which has been proven to be a significant booster of aggregate productivity at
the European level (Sala and Silva 2013).
In this context it is worth distinguishing between generic subsidies in the form of train-
ing courses for the unemployed from on-the-job training directly targeted to the needs
of the firm. In a recent study by Stokey (2015), policies that promote technology inflows
are shown to be much more effective than subsidies to human capital accumulation
in accelerating growth. In addition, differences in technology are critical for explaining
differences in income levels over time and across economies. This is relevant for our
investigation because it allows us to rationalise the enormous differences observed in eco-
nomic outcomes across countries and over time, like the ones we have uncovered in the
evolution of the RULCs.
Of course, this reasoning does not preclude the economies to improve the institutional
framework in which their labour market operates. Our point is that, given that the labour
market does not operate in isolation, technological factors cannot be neglected if these
economies seek to converge to the leading club. And even in the case that labour market
reforms limiting the scope of wage growth are judged to be inescapable, it is still true that
these reforms will be much easier to implement if the economy secures a high growth in
labour productivity9.
7 Conclusion
Were the Eurozone economies hiding structural differences in competitiveness through a
skillful management of the exchange rate? Could this strategy no longer be hidden—and
thus maintained—with the single currency, and then materialised in the form of unprece-
dented external imbalances? The results of this paper point to positive answers to these
questions.
We have shown that the RULCs have fallen almost twice as much in the Periphery
than in the non-Periphery countries over the period 1979-2012. This is the outcome
of a less expansionary wage growth process mainly counterbalanced through capital
intensity gains. On the contrary, Core Eurozone economies have experienced larger
rates of wage growth sustained through a much more dynamic process of technological
progress.
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Which one is the best strategy? Although capital accumulation boosts growth and pro-
ductivity, technology is the right way to ensure stable long-run economic growth. This
would explain why, in spite of the PIIGS effort to reduce their RULCs, they were unable
to converge to the Core Eurozone economies.
The last decades have witnessed a period of the most intensive economic integration
within Europe. Real convergence, however, has not been achieved as ex-ante expected.
Instead of finding a single cluster or, at least, a robust configuration of clubs within the
Eurozone, we have uncovered a variety of statistically significant clusters with, on top,
wide country-variation in their composition.
Cluster heterogeneity, and lack of robustness in cluster composition, would have been
such unexpected outcomes had the architects of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) been asked in 1989 Madrid’s summit whether this process would result, 25 years
later, into significant real convergence.
On the contrary, there was a quick and intensive deterioration of the current account
balance in the PIIGS since the mid 1990s, which accelerated since the inception of the
euro, and had a positive counterpart in the Core group current accounts. Our results
lead us to think that the EMU has not been the cause of the external imbalances and
the resulting sovereign-debt crisis in a context of closed financial markets. Rather, it has
boosted some structural divergencies that were already present in the growth model of
these economies.
Since these divergencies can be ascribed mainly to different technological levels rather
than to a wrong wage behaviour in the Periphery, internal devaluation policies are not
the solution to surpass the current situation in the Eurozone. These policies have forced
rebalancing of the external deficits, but they do not help convergence. And the reason is
the same we have heard many times when economies embark into external devaluations:
these are not genuine competitive gains, it is technology that matters. Hence, the need
is to widen the scope of labour market policies to emphasise productivity growth, for
example, through a renewed focus on on-the-job-training.
Endnotes
1That is, convergence in prices: inflation (the price of goods and services), interest
rates (the price of money), and exchange rate stability (the price of currencies), apart
from the commitment to keep public sector accounts fairly balanced.
2The current euro crisis is considered by many observers as a crisis of government
deficits and debt. Nevertheless, even a casual look at the data raises many doubts
regarding this point of view (Hein et al. 2012). The ratio of gross government debt to
GDP was only 25% in Ireland and 36% in Spain, whereas Portugal used to have a smaller
debt burden than Germany. This ratio was far below 60%, the reference value of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in all three countries. Nobody would have suspected
any risk of government default in these countries.
3By Periphery countries we mean Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, while the
Core economies are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Germany is not be considered since disaggregated data is only available 1991 onwards
due to the unification process.
4The RULCs can also be conceived as the Unit Labour Costs (ULC) deflated by prices
(P):
RULC = ULCP where ULC =
Nominal compensation per employee
Real labour productivity .
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5For a comprehensive analysis of the structural changes undergone by the Swedish
economy, see Freeman et al. (2010).
6Germany shows a fall of less than 12 pp, very close to the fall experienced by the
Netherlands.
7Note that the addition of the values in the second block of columns gives essentially
the same information as Simulation 7 (the C column). In the case of Greece, for
example, 4.7-(-24.4)-(-0.7)=-20.3, which is the fall in the RULC explained by our
decomposition analysis (from 100 to 79.7, which is the value in the C column).
8More precisely, note that for real wages and TFP the countries with the smallest and
biggest growths are Greece and Ireland, with differences around 90 percentage points.
In contrast, for capital intensity the divergence across economies is in the much
narrower range of 40 percentage points (between 115.6 in 2012 in the Netherlands and
154.9 in Portugal).
9This argument is used in Blanchard (2007) when assessing the policy options of
Portugal to improve its economic situation in the euro context.
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